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Abstract
Stereotypes are thought to be an important determinant of decision making, but they are hard
to systematically measure, especially for individuals in policy-making roles. In this paper,
we propose and implement a novel language-based measure of gender stereotypes for the
high-stakes context of U.S. Appellate Courts. We construct a judge-specific measure of gender-
stereotyped language use – gender slant – by looking at the linguistic association of words iden- 
tifying gender (male versus female) and words identifying gender stereotypes (career versus 
family) in the judge’s authored opinions. Exploiting quasi-random assignment of judges to
cases and conditioning on detailed biographical characteristics of judges, we study how gen-
der stereotypes influence judicial behavior. We find that judges with higher slant vote more
conservatively on women’s rights’ issues (e.g. reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and
gender discrimination). These more slanted judges also influence workplace outcomes for fe-
male colleagues: they are less likely to assign opinions to female judges, they are more likely to
reverse lower-court decisions if the lower-court judge is a woman, and they cite fewer female-
authored opinions. 
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1 Introduction
Stereotypes can be a powerful determinant of individual decisions. Attitudes toward social groups
– most notably women and racial minorities – are highly predictive of judgments and choices
(Bertrand et al., 2005), including physician treatments (Green et al., 2007), voting (Friese et al.,
2007), hiring decisions (Rooth, 2010), employer-employee interactions (Glover et al., 2017), and
teacher effectiveness (Carlana, 2019). Do stereotypes shape the decisions of those in high-stakes
policy-making roles as well? We address this question by studying how gender attitudes affect
the behavior of U.S. Appellate Courts judges.
Given their ability to set precedent, Appellate Courts (in particular, the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal) play an important role in common-law systems. This has motivated an expansive litera-
ture on the determinants of judicial decisions in federal and state courts (see Posner, 2008), which
has shown that ideological and biographical characteristics of judges (Boyd and Spriggs II, 2009;
Glynn and Sen, 2015; Kastellec, 2013; Sunstein et al., 2006) and other non-legal factors (Danziger
et al., 2011; Chen, 2014; Chen et al., 2016) matter for their decisions. In addition, some judges have
been found to be highly predictable and systematically more or less lenient for equivalent cases
(Dunn et al., 2017), suggesting a role for pre-determined judgements and the use of heuristics or
stereotypes about salient attributes in judicial decisions (Bordalo et al., 2015; Gabaix, 2014).
Research concerning stereotypes in social psychology, economics, and other social sciences
generally measures attitudes using Implicit Association Tests (IATs), where subjects are asked to
assign words to categories and reaction times are compared across trials when pairings are con-
sistent with stereotypes as opposed to when they are not (Greenwald et al., 1998). Unfortunately,
IATs are rarely available for actors in policy-making roles such as judges, which makes measure-
ment a major challenge to answering the research question.1
In this paper, we propose a way to address this challenge that exploits a unique feature of
our setting – the large corpus of written text that is available for appellate judges – and the idea
that text can provide important insights into human social psychology (Jakiela and Ozier, 2019).
1To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two papers that have collected IAT scores for judges, and neither of
them links the scores to the real world behavior of these judges. Rachlinski et al. (2009) measure implicit bias against
African-Americans of 133 state and local trial judges, finding some evidence that more biased judges prefer harsher
sentences when primed with hypothetical cases about African-Americans in a vignette experiment. Levinson et al.
(2017) collected implicit bias against Asians and Jews for 239 federal and state judges, and they found that judges
biased against Jews display different hypothetical sentencing behavior.
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In particular, we draw on recent developments in natural language processing (NLP) and proxy
judges’ attitudes toward gender by measuring their use of gender-stereotyped language (Penning-
ton et al., 2014; Caliskan et al., 2017; Kozlowski et al., 2019; Antoniak and Mimno, 2018). That is,
we develop a measure of gender slant based on how strongly judges associate men with careers
and women with families in their writing.
The key NLP technology powering our approach, word embedding, is an algorithm that dis-
tributes words in a vector space based on their co-occurrence in a corpus (Mikolov et al., 2013;
Pennington et al., 2014). Word embeddings preserve semantic relationships. First, words with
similar meaning have similar representations. Second, dimensions induced by word differences
can be used to identify cultural concepts (Kozlowski et al., 2019). For example, the vector differ-
ence −−→man−−−−−→woman isolates a gender dimension in the space.
The dimensions are useful because they produce quantitative measures of similarity between
the associated concepts and specific words in the corpus. For example, we can understand the
gender connotation of a given word by taking the cosine of the angle between the vector represen-
tation of the word and the differenced vector representing the gender dimension (Kozlowski et al.,
2019). Words with male connotations – e.g. male first names – are going to be positively correlated
with −−→man−−−−−→woman. Female words, in turn, will be negatively correlated with the dimension.
This framework provides an intuitive approach to measuring stereotypical associations in a
given corpus. In particular, we measure the intensity of gender stereotyping by looking at how
similar the gender dimension (−−→man − −−−−→woman) is to the dimension representing the stereotypical
gender roles of interest (−−−→career −−−−−→f amily). If the cosine similarity between the two dimensions is
high, the corpus uses stereotyped language – men are associated with career, while women are
associated with family. If the correlation is around zero, stereotypes are not present in the text.
To construct a judge-specific gender slant measure, we consider the majority opinions au-
thored by a given judge as a separate corpus. We then train a separate embeddings model for
each judge corpus, which allows us to calculate a judge-specific gender slant measure. To ensure
we obtain high-quality embeddings notwithstanding a small corpus, we train embeddings on dif-
ferent bootstrap samples of the corpus following Antoniak and Mimno (2018) and define gender
slant as the median value of the measure across the samples. Using this method, we calculate the
gender slant of 139 Circuit judges. Descriptively, we find that female and younger judges display
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lower gender slant and that having a daughter reduces gender slant.
This approach is related to a growing literature using word embeddings to analyze bias in
text. Bolukbasi et al. (2016) and Caliskan et al. (2017) demonstrate biases in general web corpora
in terms of gender stereotypes and a number of other dimensions. Garg et al. (2018) train separate
embeddings by decade using the Google Books corpus and show that gender associations track
demographic and occupational shifts. The closest analysis to ours is Rice et al. (2019), who detect
a racial slant in a corpus of U.S. state and federal court opinions. We build on this literature to
construct author-specific measures of slant that can be linked to real-world behavior.
The central research question of the paper is how gender slant impacts the behavior of judges.
We focus on two behaviors. First, we study how gender slant impacts judicial decisions, with a
particular focus on gender-related cases. Second, we study how gender slant affects the treatment
of female judges. The empirical strategy to estimate the causal effect of gender slant is twofold.
First, we rely on the quasi-random assignment of judges to cases to ensure that slanted judges
do not self-select into cases systematically based on the outcome. This means that cases assigned
to higher and lower slanted judges are comparable. Second, we condition on detailed judges’
characteristics to show that gender slant has an effect that goes above and beyond the judge’s
other features and is not simply acting as a proxy for some other characteristic such as gender or
conservative ideology.
We begin by studying how gender slant impacts decisions in gender-related cases. We find
that judges with higher gender slant tend to vote more conservatively in gender-related issues
(that is, against expanding women’s rights). The magnitude of the effect is large: a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the gender slant of the judge increases the probability of voting against
expanding women’s rights by 4.2 percentage points, which corresponds to a 7% increase over
the outcome mean. The result is not driven by gender slant being determined by the texts of
the gender-related opinions: if we calculate the gender slant measure on embeddings trained ex-
cluding gender-related cases, the effect is, if anything, stronger. By affecting how judges vote in
appellate cases, and therefore impacting how precedent is set, the gender attitudes we measure
in written language have the potential to impact real-word outcomes even outside the judiciary
(Chen and Sethi, 2018; Chen and Yeh, 2014c,a). Gender slant is policy relevant.
If gender slant does indeed proxy for attitudes towards gender, as is suggested by the decision
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results, it should also influence how judges interact with female colleagues in the court. We ex-
plore this question by studying three sets of interactions with female judges: opinion assignment,
reversals of district court decisions, and citations. We find that gender slant affects the treatment
of female judges. First, we consider the decision of a senior judge tasked with assigning the writ-
ing of the majority opinion to a panel member. Assigning judges with higher gender slant are less
likely to assign opinion authorship to a female judge by 1.7 percentage points, or 4.5% of the base-
line mean. Second, we show using a differences-in-differences design that more slanted judges
are more likely to vote to reverse lower-court decisions authored by female district judges with
respect to those authored by male district judges. Again, the magnitude of the effect is sizable, cor-
responding to around 5% of the baseline mean. Notably, female district judges are 2.3 percentage
points less likely to be reversed, so gender slant goes against this baseline. Finally, more slanted
judges are also less likely to cite opinions of female judges, although identification is weaker and
the result is less robust. To the extent that these outcomes are relevant for future promotion op-
portunities, the gender attitudes measured by gender slant have the potential to hinder the career
progression of female district judges relative to male district judges.
To strengthen the case that gender slant proxies for gender preferences, we investigate whether
slanted judges also respond differently to non-gender characteristics. While we do find that
higher-slanted judges tend to vote more conservatively in non-gender-related but ideologically
divisive cases, the effect of slant is smaller than in gender-related cases. In addition, we find that
gender slant has little to no effect on how judges interact with colleagues who were appointed
by a Democratic President, who are minorities, or who are in a different age group. Overall, this
confirms that gender slant captures attitudes that are specific to gender.
This paper builds on the literature on the determinants of judicial decisions, showing that de-
mographic and ideological characteristics of judges predict their decisions (Boyd and Spriggs II,
2009; Kastellec, 2013; Sunstein et al., 2006; Cohen and Yang, 2019). Recent work has shown that
in criminal cases, judges systematically demonstrate racial (Arnold et al., 2018; Rehavi and Starr,
2014) and gender (Starr, 2014) disparities in their sentencing decisions. Instead of inferring bias
from the decisions themselves, we take a different approach by considering a proxy of stereotyp-
ical gender attitudes and asking how this impacts decisions.2 This allows us to directly study the
2We could potentially construct a measure of voting disparities in gender-related cases and use this measure to study
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role played by stereotypical gender attitudes, at least as far as these can be measured from judges’
writing. The existing evidence on stereotypes in the judiciary is limited to studies that look at the
correlation between attitudes measured by Implicit Association Tests and decisions in hypotheti-
cal scenarios (Rachlinski et al., 2009; Levinson et al., 2017). Instead, our measure allows us to link
stereotypical attitudes to real world outcomes.
If we think of courts as a workplace, the paper speaks to the literature on how gender shapes
the labor market outcomes of women and why (see among others Bohren et al., 2019; Bordalo
et al. (2019); Card et al., 2019; Hengel, 2019; Sarsons, 2019), in particular for women employed
at the top end of the earnings distribution (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Bertrand, 2013; Bertrand et al.,
2010). Despite the richness of the data, the setting we study is quite novel: there is a scarcity
of existing work that takes this approach toward the courts, in particular to study the potential
for gender discrimination toward female judges.3 In addition, we contribute to this literature by
providing evidence that stereotypical attitudes might play a direct role in determining differential
labor market outcomes for men and women, even in high-stakes environments such as Appellate
Courts.
More generally, this paper contributes to the growing literature demonstrating the importance
of stereotypes in decision making. For example, Glover et al. (2017) show that stereotypes regard-
ing minorities influence manager-employee interactions in a way that impacts performance, and
Carlana (2019) shows that teachers with stereotypical views of gender negatively impact the test
scores and future scholastic careers of female students. Our novel text-based measure of stereo-
typical attitudes allows us to study the role played by stereotypes in determining the behavior
of high-skilled professionals, who might otherwise be hard to reach through surveys or tests tra-
ditionally used in the literature. Stereotypes matter, even for high-stakes decisions that have the
power to influence public policy for years to come.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our measure of gender
slant, and Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and presents additional data sources. Section
4 provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the effect of gender slant on judicial decisions,
how this impacts female judges. Our setting is not well suited for this approach. In particular, as we will discuss in
detail below, we are constrained to use pre-coded datasets for vote valence. This means that we have at most 50 votes
per judge, which would make calculating gender bias measures based on votes challenging.
3The one exception is contemporaneous work by Battaglini et al. (2019), who show that random exposure to female
judges on panels increases the probability of hiring a female clerk.
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while Section 6 discusses how gender slant impacts female judges. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Gender Slant: Measuring Gender Stereotypes in Text
The starting point of the paper is to construct a measure of how gender is characterized in the lan-
guage used by judges, in particular whether judges’ writing displays stereotypical views of gen-
der. Our measure aims to capture the strength of the association between gender identifiers and
stereotypical gender roles, with men being more career-oriented and women being more strongly
associated to family.
2.1 Word Embeddings
In order to construct our measure, we use word embeddings, a language modeling technique
from natural language processing that relies on word co-occurrence to create a representation in
a (relatively) low dimensional Euclidean space in such a way as to preserve semantic meaning
(Mikolov et al., 2013; Pennington et al., 2014).
Consider the simplest way of representing language. For a given vocabulary V, one possibility
is to represent words as one-hot-encoded vectors, with all values equal to 0 except the one entry
corresponding to the word itself. This approach presents two issues. First, the dimensionality of
the vector space grows linearly in the size of the vocabulary, as the one-hot-encoded vectors are
V-dimensional by construction. Second, it is impossible to infer anything about the relationship
between words in the resulting space: all word vectors are orthogonal to each other.
Word embeddings offer a solution to both issues. The word representations are low-dimensional
– in our case, 300 dimensionals – dense vectors which can accommodate large vocabularies and
corpora without increasing dimensionality. In addition, the positions of word vectors in the space
encode relations between words.
Word embeddings encode semantic meaning in two principal ways. First, distance in the
word embedding space conveys semantic similarity between words. The position of a word’s
representation in the vector space is assigned based on the context the word appears in: words that
appear frequently in the same context have representations close to each other in the space, while
words that appear rarely together have representations that are far apart. Importantly, given that
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a vector’s position is defined based on appearance in given contexts, word embedding distance
can identify that two words are similar even if they do not necessarily often appear together, as
long as the neighboring words tend to be similar.
Second, the direction of the vectors and the differences between vectors that identify directions
in the space also convey meaning. As Figure 1 illustrates, going from the vector representing
the word −−−−→woman to the vector representing the word −−→man means taking a step in the ‘maleness’
direction, and taking the same step from the vector representing the word−−−→queen will bring us close
to the vector representing the word
−−→
king as well.
2.2 GloVe Embeddings Implementation
The specific model we use is Global Vectors for Word Representation (Pennington et al., 2014).
GloVe is a weighted least squares model that trains word vectors on global co-occurrence counts.
GloVe first computes a global co-occurrence matrix, which reports the number of times two words
have occurred within a given context window. It then obtains word vectors wi ∈ w to minimize
the following objective function:
J(w) =∑
i,j
f
(
Xij
) (
wTi wj − log
(
Xij
))2
where Xij is the co-occurrence count between words i and j and f (·) is a weighting function that
serves to down-weight particularly frequent words. The objective function J(·) effectively trains
the word vectors to minimize the squared difference between the dot product of the vectors rep-
resenting two words and their empirical co-occurrence in the corpus. Our GloVe implementation
minimizes J(·) by stochastic gradient descent.
The two key hyperparameters for GloVe are the dimensionality of the vectors and the win-
dow size for computing co-occurence statistics. Previous experiments by NLP researchers suggest
that increasing dimensionality beyond 300 has negligible improvements for downstream tasks
(Pennington et al., 2014; Spirling and Rodriguez, 2019), so we follow that literature and train 300-
dimensional vectors. In turn, we choose a standard window size of 10, a middle ground between
shorter windows – which would tend to capture syntactic/functional relations between words –
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and longer windows – which tend to capture topical relations between words.4
A practical feature of GloVe is that the algorithm goes through the full corpus only once in
order to build the initial co-occurrence matrix. This feature accounts for the considerable im-
provements in training time compared to other popular word embeddings algorithms, namely
word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2013), while obtaining embeddings of comparable quality (Pennington
et al., 2014). Given that our approach requires the training of a large number of separate embed-
dings, this is a particularly attractive feature for our application.
2.3 Word Vectors and Gender Slant
We use word embeddings to identify cultural dimensions in language (Kozlowski et al., 2019).
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, a key feature of word embeddings is that the direction
of the difference between word vectors in the space conveys meaning. Consider the vector repre-
senting the word−−→man and the vector representing the word−−−−→woman. The vector difference between
the two, i.e. the vector identified by −−→man−−−−−→woman, identifies a dimension in the space that cor-
responds to a step in the male direction. The difference between male and female can be used to
identify a gender dimension in the space. In practice, since this is true for
−→
boy − −→girl, −→he − −→she ,
and so on, we can identify a gender dimension in the space by taking the difference between the
average normalized vector across a set of male words and the average normalized vector across a
set of female words:
−−→
male−−−−−→f emale = ∑n
−−−−−−−→
male wordn
|Nmale| −
∑n
−−−−−−−−→
f emale wordn∣∣N f emale∣∣ ,
where |Nmale| is the number of words used to identify the male dimension.
A desirable feature of the Euclidean geometry of the vector space and the gender dimension is
that other words meaningfully project onto it. It is then possible to understand the connotation of
other words along the gender dimension by looking at the cosine of the angle between the vector
4Appendix Figure 3 shows that 100- and 300-dimensional embeddings produce highly correlated measures of gen-
der slant. The same is true for embeddings trained using 5, 10, or 15 word windows ( Appendix Figure 2).
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representing the word and the dimension itself. Formally, we use the cosine similarity, defined as:
sim
(
~x,−→y ) = cos (θ) = ~x ·~y‖~x‖ ‖~y‖ = ∑ xiyi√∑ x2i√∑ y2i ,
where ~x and ~y are non-zero vectors, θ is the associated angle, and ‖·‖ is the 2-norm. Note that
sim
(
~x,−→y ) varies between -1 and +1. Continuing with the example, words with male (female)
connotations – e.g. male (female) first names – are going to be positively (negatively) correlated
with the gender dimension defined by
−−→
male−−−−−→f emale.
We put these dimensions in the service of constructing a gender slant measure. The goal is
to capture the strength of the association between gender and stereotypical attitudes – identify-
ing men more closely with career, and women with family. Word embeddings provide an intu-
itive metric. Specifically, we use the cosine similarity between the vector representing the gender
dimension, defined by
−−→
male − −−−−→f emale, and the vector representing the career-family dimension,
defined by −−−→career −−−−−→f amily. The statistical similarity summarizes how closely related the gender
and stereotypical dimension are in the space, as illustrated in Figure 2. When the two concepts are
strongly associated in a corpus, the two vectors are close together (θ ≈ 0), and the slant measure
is close to 1 (Figure 2 (a)). If there is no association between the two, then θ ≈ 90◦, and the slant
measure is 0 (Figure 2 (b)). Finally, if the concepts are negatively associated in a corpus (e.g. male
is associated to family and female is associated to career), the two vectors are far apart (θ ≈ 180◦),
and the slant measure will tend to -1 (Figure 2 (c)).
For this task, there are many potential combinations of male, female, career, and family words
that could be used to identify the gender and career-family dimension. We select the word sets to
identify the dimensions using the following procedure. First, we identify potential word sets using
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Dictionaries, which provide a human-validated list of words
and word stems that correspond to certain concepts. We use the word sets for male, female, work
and family. From these word sets, we eliminate words that could be ambiguous or have specific
legal meanings in our setting (e.g. tribe, tribes for family; line, situation, trade for work). From
each list, we then select the ten most frequent words in the full judicial corpus.5 Table 1 reports
5We select words using these procedures as opposed to the word sets usually used in the gender-career IAT because
we want to ensure that we are using words that meaningfully define gender in judicial language. For example, first
names are rarely used in legal language as opposed to gender pronouns, which would introduce substantial noise in
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the resulting word sets. In addition, we show how the results change when selecting the top five
to top fifteen most frequent words and when dropping one word at a time in the career versus
family dimension.6
2.4 Measuring Judge Gender Slant
Our goal is to produce measures of gender stereotypes in the writing of Circuit Court judges. Our
starting corpus is the universe of published opinions in U.S. Circuit Courts for the years 1890-2013,
which consists of 380,000 opinions in thirteen courts from Bloomberg Law.
As a pre-processing step, we clean that text and exclude punctuation and numbers, although
we retain hyphenated words. To avoid the word vectors being case sensitive, we transform all
words to be lower cased. We then retain only the most common 50,000 words in all judicial opin-
ions. Opinions are separated into sentences using punctuation, and each sentence is further tok-
enized into words. These tokenized sentences are the starting point of the model.
To obtain judge-specific gender slant measures, we take the set of majority opinions authored
by each judge as a separate corpus. We train separate GloVe embeddings on each judge’s corpus,
and we used the resulting vectors to compute the gender slant measure as described in Subsection
2.3. To ensure convergence, we train vectors for 20 iterations with a learning rate of 0.05.
Creating judge-specific embeddings implies the use of relatively small corpora, which is po-
tentially a problem given that word embeddings perform best when they are trained on large col-
lections. To address this issue, we follow the approach suggested by Antoniak and Mimno (2018)
and train embedding models on twenty-five bootstrap samples of each judge corpus. Specifically,
we consider each sentence written by a judge as a document, and then create a corpus by sampling
with replacement from all sentences. The number of sentences contained in the bootstrapped sam-
the slant measure.
6We focus on the stereotypical association between men and career versus women and family as opposed to other
associations typically studied in the literature – for example, the association between men and science versus women
and arts, and between men and positive attributes versus women and negative attributes – for several reasons. First,
words related to sciences and arts do not frequently appear in the corpus, which makes it difficult to identify the science
– art dimension in the language space (see Appendix Table 1). Second, we only find limited evidence that the full
judicial corpus presents a stereotypical association between men and positive attributes versus women and negative
attributes, which suggests limited scope for this measure to capture judge-specific variation in gender attitudes. In fact,
Appendix Figure 1 shows that in the full judicial corpus, the cosine similarity between the gender and the positive-
negative dimension is generally smaller and closer to zero with respect to the cosine similarity between the gender and
the career-family dimension. When we perform a permutation test following Caliskan et al. (2017), we indeed find
p-values lower than 0.10 in only three of the twenty-four bootstrapped embeddings trained on the full judicial corpus.
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ple is the same as the total number of sentences in the original judge corpus. We then calculate
our measure for all bootstrap samples and assign to each judge the median value of the measure
across the samples. Given that embeddings trained on small corpora tend to be sensitive to the in-
clusion of specific documents, the bootstrap procedure produces more stable results. In addition,
bootstrapping ensures stability with respect to the initialization of the word vectors, a potential
concern given that GloVe presents a non-convex objective function (Spirling and Rodriguez, 2019).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of gender slant across judges in the sample. The figure shows
there is significant variation in how strongly judges associate men with career and women with
family in their language. To put the measure in perspective, the vertical lines on the same graph
show the degree of gender slant of a sample of recent U.S. Supreme Court justices for which
we were able to measure gender slant. Interestingly, the conservative Justice Antonin Scalia has
the highest slant of the group, while more liberal judges such as Justice Anthony Kennedy have
relatively lower slant.7
2.5 Validating Judge-Specific Embeddings
Even following the bootstrapping procedure, we might still worry about the quality of the judge-
specific embeddings, and in particular, whether they are able to capture meaningful information
about gender. To validate the judge-specific embeddings, we compute the cosine similarity be-
tween the gender dimension and each of the vectors representing the most common 25 male and
female names according to the 1990 census for each judge and bootstrap sample. We then regress
a dummy for whether the name is male on the median cosine similarity between the vector repre-
senting the name and the gender dimension across bootstrap samples, separately for each judge.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the t-statistics resulting from these regressions
for sets of judges with different number of tokens. The figure shows that, for judges with a small
number of tokens, the t-statistics are rarely above conventional significance level and are at times
even negative. As the number of tokens increases, the t-statistics start to become significant and
are never lower than zero, showing that the gender dimension identified in the embeddings does
7The gender slant of Supreme Court justices is measured by training embeddings on the U.S. Supreme Court ma-
jority opinions that were authored by these judges. Finding judges with corpora of sufficient size (see the followig
sub-section) is even more difficult in this setting: the figure shows the gender slant of justices with at least 1,000,000
tokens in their corpus. Unfortunately, none of the female justices (e.g. Ginsburg and O’Connor) reached the minimum
token threshold.
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indeed contain meaningful gender information. Based on these experiments, all of our main re-
sults focus on the 139 judges whose corpus includes at least 1,500,000 tokens.8
2.6 Discussion of Alternative Measures
There are (perhaps many) other approaches that we could have used to measure gender stereo-
types in judicial language. In particular, these two alternatives come to mind.
First, we could have had human evaluators qualitatively score the writing of judges. These
coders could have done a deep reading of the text or a subjective coding of important themes
(Glaser and Strauss, 2017). However, this qualitative approach is somewhat subjective and there-
fore lacks a rigorous method of replication (Ricoeur, 1981; DiMaggio, 1997). It would also be pro-
hibitively expensive to implement on a large scale such as we have in our corpus, which contains
over 14 million sentences.
Second, we could have looked at stereotypical language more directly, by asking, for exam-
ple, whether career or family related words tend to appear more frequently with gender identi-
fiers. The advantage of word embeddings relative to the count approach is that the global co-
occurrences do not require words to appear directly next to each other to register an association,
and are therefore able to take into account more information contained in judges’ writing. A
count-based approach would likely miss implicit and nuanced gender stereotyping and therefore
provide a less precise measure. Nonetheless, we show in Appendix Figure 4 that gender slant is
negatively correlated with use of gender-neutral language (e.g. “himself or herself”, “he or she”
as opposed to the common practice of using male pronouns when the gender of the subject is not
specified).
8Around 1000 judges served in Circuit Courts from 1890-2013. Of these, 475 (272) have at least 500,000 (1,000,000)
tokens in their corpus. Out of these 139 judges with 1.5 million tokens, 12% are women (17 judges) and 42% were
appointed by a Democratic President (58 judges). The judges in our sample do not appear to be highly selected as
compared to judges with a minimum corpus size of 50,000 tokens: they are not significantly different in terms of party
of appointing President, gender, and race, although they are more likely to be born after 1920.
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3 Empirical Strategy and Additional Data Sources
3.1 Empirical Strategy
The main objective of the paper is to study the effect of gender slant on the behavior of judges.
The empirical strategy relies on the quasi-random assignment of judges to cases – which means
that slanted judges do not self-select into cases systematically based on the outcome – and on
conditioning on detailed judges’ biographic characteristics, which ensures that gender slant is not
acting as a proxy for some other of the judges’ features.
Quasi-Random Assignment. A major concern for identification is the endogeneous selection
of judges to cases, as we might worry that slanted judges decide which panels to sit on based
on the expected outcome of the case. We address this issue by exploiting the fact that in Cir-
cuit Courts, cases are quasi-randomly assigned to panels formed by three judges, which ensures
comparability of cases seen by judges with higher and lower slant.9
Evidence supporting the quasi-random assignment of panels to cases has been provided by
Chen and Sethi (2018), who show for a sample of gender-discrimination cases that pre-trial char-
acteristics of the case are uncorrelated with the demographic composition of the panel, and by
Chen et al. (2014), who show that the panel composition does not appear to be autocorrelated
over time. Here, we provide additional evidence by showing that higher-slanted judges do not
appear to be systematically hearing cases on specific topics. In particular, we perform a series of
regressions where an indicator variable for a given topic (one of 89 topics) is regressed on judge
gender slant and circuit-year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by judge. Appendix Fig-
ure 5 shows that just 15 of the 89 coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level, in line with
what we would expect by chance.
Conditioning on Observable Characteristics. Random assignment of judges to cases implies
that the effect of being assigned a slanted judge is well-identified, but the effect of gender slant
itself could be confounded with other judge characteristics that affect decisions or behavior. For
9Chen and Sethi (2018) and Bowie et al. (2014) report detailed information on how the random assignment of cases to
panels work, based on qualitative interviews with officials of the courts. Judges are chosen from a pool of 8-40 judges,
depending on the specific circuit. Before oral arguments, available judges (including visiting judges) are assigned
following a quasi-random process. In recent years, assignment is often done using a computer program. The program
might place some limits on judges serving on the same panel and on how many cases are assigned to senior judges. It
is possible that judges recuse themselves at times, and in rare occasions randomization is not used for some specialized
cases (e.g. cases involving the death penalty) but they would generally do so before random assignment.
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example, male judges might be more conservative and also have higher slant. We address this
issue by exploiting detailed information on the demographic characteristics of these judges, which
allows us to directly control for other characteristics of the judge that might correlate both with
gender slant and with decisions. In other words, identification requires that conditional on the
covariates, slant is not systematically correlated with other omitted factors related to voting or
treatment of female judges. In Appendix A.7, we assess this assumption using the method from
Oster (2019).
3.2 Additional Data Sources
This paper combines four principal data sources, in addition to the text data used to construct the
gender slant measure for each judge described in the previous section.
Judges’ Biographic Characteristics. The data on judge characteristics are from the Appeals
Court Attribute Data, the Federal Judicial Center, and previous data collection from Chen and
Yeh (2014b). The final dataset has information on gender, party of appointing President, region of
birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience
prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. It also includes information on the full history of
federal court appointments held by the judge.
Judicial Decisions. To study the effect of gender slant on decisions, we use two existing legal
datasets with hand-coded vote direction and topic, created by Epstein et al. (2013) and Glynn and
Sen (2015). The datasets were originally constructed by searching for cases related to a given set of
topics, and then having research assistants read through the opinions to code whether each judge’s
vote was liberal or conservative.10,11 For gender-related issues—namely, reproductive rights, gen-
der discrimination, and sexual harassment—a liberal vote corresponds to a vote in support of
10The need to code the direction of the vote (in favor or against expanding women’s rights) is why we are constrained
to using these pre-existing datasets, as we do not know the ’directionality’ of votes in the larger Circuit Court dataset
that we use in the analysis regarding the treatment of female judges.
11In particular, the Epstein et al. (2013) dataset contains all published opinions related to abortion, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, affirmative action, campaign finance, capital punishment, the contracts clause, criminal appeals,
environmental regulation, federalism, piercing the corporate veil, race discrimination, sex discrimination, sexual ha-
rassment, and takings. The dataset is updated until 2008, but the starting years of the dataset vary by issue, ranging
from 1982 for abortion to 1995 to capital punishment. The original dataset was constructed by searching for cases re-
lated to each issue backwards from the present, and stopping when a sufficient number of cases was reached for that
issue. The Glynn and Sen (2015) data contain all published and unpublished opinions from 1996 to 2002 that contain
the words “gender”, “pregnancy” or “sex” in the case headings. When the two datasets are pooled, we drop duplicate
cases present in both datasets.
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extending women’s rights. The analysis pools the two datasets.
In addition, we have information on circuit court cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals datasets
(Songer, 2008; Kuersten and Haire, 2011). These data include a 5% random sample of Circuit cases
that were hand-coded for vote valence (liberal, conservative, or neutral/hard to code).
Circuit Court Cases. To study interactions with female judges, we exploit detailed records
from all 380,000 U.S. Circuit Court cases for the years 1890-2013, which we obtained from Bloomberg
Law. For each case, the records include information on year, circuit, and topic, as well as the panel
of judges assigned to decide on it. For each assigned judge, we have information on whether they
voted to affirm or reverse the district court decision, whether they authored the majority opinion,
and whether they dissented/concurred.
For a subsect of the cases, we are also able to match the case to the identity of the district judge
who decided the corresponding lower-court case. The judge’s name is obtained either directly
from the district case’s metadata or by parsing the name from the circuit opinion’s case history.12
We then match the name of the district judge to their biographical information from the Federal
Judicial Center. We are able to assign a unique district judge (and associated gender) to 145,862
circuit cases (38% of all cases).
Citations. We use the full text of the opinions to extract information on which cases are cited
in the same opinion. We use this dataset to define a citation network that includes both backward
and forward citations for each case.
Clerks. Information on Circuit Court clerks are from Katz and Stafford (2010) and additional
original data collection from Chen (2019).
4 Gender Slant and Demographic Characteristics
This section explores descriptively how the gender slant measure varied based on with judge char-
acteristics. We begin by correlating the gender slant measure and different judge characteristics,
using separate univariate regressions with robust standard errors.
12More precisely, the algorithm starts with all district judges, then checks for every case/case history for the corre-
sponding court. Out of the judges within that specific district court, it then narrows it down to the judges that were
active during the time of the case, plus two years to allow for appeal proceedings. Finally, based on a name similarity
measure (Levenshtein distance), district judges are assigned if the score is above 70 (out of a maximum 100).
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Table 2 reports estimates from these regressions. Column (1) shows that judges nominated by
Presidents of different parties do not appear to display different levels of gender slant. Looking
at the entire distribution of gender slant separately by party (Figure 5 (a)) confirms the result, and
according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions, the difference is
not statistically significant (p = 0.952).
Column (2) shows that female judges display on average gender slant that is 0.5 standard
deviations lower than male judges. The difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. Ex-
amining the full distribution (Figure 5 (b)) shows that the distribution of slant for female judges
is clearly shifted to the left relative to the one for male judges, and the difference is significant
according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions (p = 0.012).
Column (3) shows that there is no difference depending on judge race, possibly an artifact of
there being very few minority judges included in the sample. As one would expect, older judges
tend to have significantly higher gender slant (column (4)): judges that were born before 1920 dis-
play between 0.5 and 0.765 standard deviation higher slant than judges born between 1930 and
1939 and after 1940. While this is consistent with older judges holding more socially conserva-
tive views, this variation might reflect differences in the cases that were tried by the judges, as
older judges served in court in periods with lower female labor force participation. Interestingly,
judge cohort appears to have the strongest explanatory power across all different demographic
characteristics.
Column (5) includes all characteristics in the same regression and additionally controls for
judge religion, law school attended, whether the judge had federal experience prior to being ap-
pointed to the Circuit Courts, and circuit fixed effects. The previously discussed correlations re-
main.13 Overall, female judges and younger judges display the lowest gender slant.
What explains the variation in gender slant across judges? Gender slant might be partially
representational and reflect variation in the facts of the cases tried by the judges. Here, we ex-
plore a different possibility: exposure to women. In particular, we ask whether judges that have
13There is no difference in the gender slant of judges born in different regions. Jewish judges appear to be slightly less
slanted than Protestant judges. As far as law schools are concerned, judges who received their J.D.s from Yale display
lower slant than judges who received their J.D.s from Harvard, while Stanford judges have higher slant. Finally, judges
from the 3rd (PA, DE, MD), 6th (MI, OH, KT, TN), and Federal Circuits have higher slant than judges from the 1st
Circuit (ME, MA, RI, CT), while judges from the 7th Circuit (WI, IL, IN) display lower gender slant.
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daughters display different levels of slanted language.14 Given that, conditional on total number
of children, gender should be as good as randomly assigned, we can estimate the causal effect of
having daughters on slant (Washington, 2008; Glynn and Sen, 2015).
To perform the analysis, we combine our measure of slant from information of judges’ family
composition from Glynn and Sen (2015). We estimate the following specification:
Gender Slantj = βDaughterj + X
′
jγ+ δc + δn + ej (1)
where Gender Slantj is the slant (standardized cosine similarity between the gender and career-
family dimensions) of judge j, Daughterj is an indicator variable equal to 1 if judge j has at least one
daughter, Xj are demographic characteristics of judge j (gender, party of nominating president,
race, religion, region of birth, cohort of birth, law school attended, and whether the judge had
federal experience prior to appointment), δc are circuit fixed effects, and δn are number of children
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust.
Table 2 column (6) reports the estimates. We find that, conditional on the number of children,
having a daughter lowers gender slant by 0.490 standard deviations. In comparison, female judges
tend to have about 0.713 lower gender slant than male judges in this sample. The effect is only sig-
nificant at the 10% level, and is not robust to additionally controlling for two-way interactions for
gender, party, and race. But, while these estimates should be interpreted carefully, it is interesting
to note that they are potentially consistent with the view that gender exposure may be important
for gender attitudes, in line with the recent literature on the effect of direct contact on attitudes
towards specific groups (Lowe, 2019; Alesina et al., 2018; Corno et al., 2019).15
14The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Exposure to women, and in particular having daughters, might
matter for slant for potentially different reasons, including learning, empathy, or preference realignment (Glynn and
Sen, 2015).
15To put the gender slant measure in prospective, Appendix ?? shows how the gender slant measure correlates with
measures of implicit and explicit bias traditionally used in the literature.
18
5 Effect of Gender Slant on Judicial Decisions
This section asks whether gender slant influences how judges make decisions in gender-related
cases. We estimate the following specification:
Conservative Votejcit = βGender Slantj + X
′
jγ+ δct + ε ictj (2)
where Conservative Voteictj is an indicator variable equal to 1 if judge j of circuit c voted conser-
vatively (against expanding women’s rights) in case i during year t, Gender Slantj is the slant
(standardized cosine similarity between the gender and career-family dimensions) of judge j, Xj
are demographic characteristics of judge j (gender, party of nominating president, race, religion,
region of birth, cohort of birth, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal expe-
rience prior to appointment), and δct are circuit-year fixed effects. The circuit-year fixed effects
δct ensure that we are using within-circuit-year variation, for which cases are quasi-randomly as-
signed to panels. Instead, controlling for the demographic characteristics tests whether gender
slant contains signal above and beyond that of other features of the judge. The dataset includes
one observation for the vote of each judge in each case. Standard errors are clustered at the judge
level.
Table 3 shows how slant affects decisions on gender-related cases. Column (1) estimates the
baseline specification with demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects. Judges with a one
standard deviation higher slant are less likely to vote in favor of expanding women’s rights in
gender-related cases by 4.2 percentage points. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level.16,17
The result is unchanged if we additionally control for two-way interactions of gender, party, and
race (column (2)). Moreover, column (3) shows that the result is also robust to controlling for
“career fixed effects”—indicator variables equal to 1 if the judge sat on at least one case in a given
circuit over a 25-year period, which ensures that we are comparing judges who were exposed to
16Appendix Table 2 displays the result of the test proposed in Oster (2019) for bounding selection of unobservable
based on selection on observables. Based on the test, selection seems to be limited in this setting: selection on unob-
servable characteristics would need to be twice as large as selection on observables for the treatment effect to equal
0.
17Appendix Figure 6 shows a binned scatterplot of the main relationship between gender slant and decisions in
gender-related cases, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects.
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similar cases.18,19
The magnitude of the effect is sizable. In the baseline specification, a one standard deviation
increase in the gender slant of the judge decreases the probability of voting in favor of expanding
women’s rights by 4.2 percentage points. This corresponds to a 7% decrease over the outcome
mean. To put this in perspective, the effect of increasing the gender slant measure by one standard
deviation has around one-third of the effect of the judge being nominated by a Democratic Pres-
ident. Given that gender slant is measured with error, meanwhile, the estimates are likely to be
attenuated toward zero. In short, gender slant affects decisions in gender-related cases, and the-
fore has the potential to influence real-world outcomes that are directly impacted by them (Chen
and Sethi, 2018; Chen and Yeh, 2014c,a)). Gender slant is policy-relevant.
Robustness Checks. A potential concern with the gender slant measure is that the corpus
of authored opinion might offer a limited reflection of the judges’ preferences, if judicial clerks
are the ones responsible for drafting opinions. However, Appendix Table 7 column (1) shows
that controlling for the share of the judges’ clerks that are women does not impact the results,
suggesting that gender slant is not just proxying for clerk characteristics.
As a placebo test, we check whether the association between gender and positive/negative at-
tributes, which does not appear to be a relevant measure of gender attitudes in this setting as dis-
cussed in Appendix A.1, holds any explanatory power in explaining decisions in gender-related
cases. Reassuringly, Appendix Table 7 column (2) shows that this is not the case: the standard-
ized cosine similarity between the gender and positive-negative dimensions is not correlated with
decisions in gender-related cases.
Robustness to Word Set Choice. These results do not depend on the specific choice of words
used for constructing the male-female and career-family dimension. We experiment with expand-
ing or restricting the word sets, or dropping single words at a time, and present the results in
Appendix Figure 10. In particular, the graph to the left shows the coefficient on slant from the
18Career fixed effects are different from circuit-year fixed effects: they are a biographical characteristic that refers to
the career of the judge, and not a characteristic of the specific case. While random assignment of judges to cases ensures
that judges are exposed to similar cases in a given circuit and year, it is still possible that the cases tried across circuits
and years might be different. The aim of the career fixed effects is then to control for this by using variation across
judges who served in similar years and areas. We are constrained in how detailed the career fixed effects can be by the
relatively small number of judges in our sample.
19Appendix Table 6 shows the results are the same if we separetely estimate the regression for the Epstein et al. (2013)
and Glynn and Sen (2015) datasets.
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baseline specification (equation (2)), together with 95% confidence intervals, from different re-
gressions where slant is identified using the top five to top fifteen most frequent male, female,
career, and family words from LIWC in the full judicial corpus. The graphs to the right show
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from separate regressions where slant is measured by
dropping one attribute word at the time. Smaller word sets give larger confidence intervals and
weaker explanatory power of decisions in gender-related cases, but the result is otherwise robust
to the choice of the word sets. At the same time, no single word is driving the result: the main
coefficient is remarkably stable across all the regressions displayed in the graphs to the right.
Gender Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases. A potential concern with these results is
that the gender slant measure could itself be determined by the texts of the gender-related case
opinions. Under this argument, cases involving gender-normative situations (women at home and
men at work) could be systematically correlated with more conservative decisions, and judges
with higher slant might be more exposed to such cases in their careers. We believe this to be
unlikely for the following reasons. First, as highlighted before, random assignment of judges
to cases implies that cases are comparable within a given circuit and year. Still, while judges
serving across circuits or time might be exposed to different types of cases, our results are robust
to including judge cohort fixed effects and career fixed effects, which work to control for the types
of cases judges have been exposed to. Second, gender-related cases constitute a small proportion
of the texts in the full corpus: only 17,523 cases out of the 114,702 circuit court cases on which we
train the judge-specific word embeddings are gender related.20 Third, the bootstrap procedure
we employ to train the word embeddings ensures that the measure is not driven by any specific
opinions. Nonetheless, we also show directly that the results are not driven by writing in gender-
related cases. As shown in Table 3 column (4), the result is unchanged if the gender slant measure
is computed on embeddings trained excluding gender-related cases.21
20We identify gender-related cases using a simple pattern-based sequence-classification method. The method iden-
tifies a case to be gender-related if it contains a word that is much more likely to appear in gender-related cases as
identified by the Epstein et al. (2013) and Glynn and Senn (2015) datasets than in an equally sized random sample of
cases not identified to be gender-related according to these two datasets. First, we match the cases identified to the
related opinions string matching on citations and party names. We are able to match 86% of the cases. Second, we
define a word to be gender-related if it is twenty-five times more likely to appear in gender-related cases versus non
gender-related cases, and if it appears at least 500 times in gender-related cases.
21A less intuitive possibility is that gender slant might still proxy for differences in the types of cases that judges
oversee, in which case we would be estimating the effect of exposure to such cases. Again, we believe that this is not a
significant concern given that we control for judge characteristics such as cohort, and the fact that the results are robust
to career fixed effects and to excluding gender-related cases where language might exhibit stereotypical associations.
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Non-Gender-Related Cases. Finally, to make the case that gender slant proxies for gender
preferences, we should expect it to have larger effects on gender-related cases as opposed to non-
gender-related cases. Two separate datasets allow us to explore this question. First, we use the Ep-
stein et al. (2013) dataset, which also includes decisions in ideologically divisive but non-gender-
related issues such as age discrimination or campaign finance, to study the effect of gender slant
on decisions in these types of cases. Appendix Table 8 shows that gender slant has a positive effect
on voting conservatively in non-gender-related cases, but the effect is around two thirds as big as
the effect of slant in gender-related cases. Two additional pieces of evidence are consistent with a
gender-focused effect. If we estimate the baseline specification controlling for the share of conser-
vative votes of the judge in non-gender-related cases, the effect of slant on conservative votes in
gender-related cases is unchanged (Appendix Table 7). In addition, if we estimate a differences-
in-differences specification in which we compare gender- and non-gender-related cases that are
assigned to judges with different levels of gender slant, we find that judges with higher slant
are more likely to vote conservatively in gender-related as opposed to non-gender-related cases
(Appendix Table 9).
Second, we use the U.S. Court of Appeals datasets (Songer, 2008; Kuersten and Haire, 2011),
which includes a 5% random sample of Circuit cases that were hand-coded for vote valence (lib-
eral, conservative, or neutral/hard to code). Appendix Table 10 shows that gender slant has no
effect on the probability of casting a liberal vote across all specifications. Taken together, these
results show that while gender slant may be correlated with holding liberal views, the measure
does indeed also capture attitudes that are specific to gender.22
6 Effect of Gender Slant on Treatment of Female Judges
Female judges are the minority in U.S. Courts. In our data, around 10% of Circuit judges are
women, and only 20% of panels include at least one female judge. As shown in Figure 6, there
were very few female judges before the 1970s, with Judge Florence Einwood Allen being the
notable early exception. There are likely many factors contributing to the gender disparity in
judgeships (see for example Jacobi and Schweers (2017) on gender differences in interruptions of
22The results are robust to restricting the sample after 1960, which is not surprising to the extent that 82% of the
sample belongs to the post-1960 period.
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Supreme Court judges). In this section we ask whether gender slant manifests itself in differential
treatment by judges toward their female colleagues. We focus on dimensions that are relevant to
a judge’s career. In particular, we explore the following outcomes: whether female judges are as-
signed the writing of majority opinions, whether lower-court decisions by female judges are more
likely to be reversed with respect to lower-court decisions by male judges, and forward citations
by future judges.
6.1 Effect of Gender Slant on Disparities in Opinion Authorship
In Circuit Courts, decisions are generally taken in conference by the three judges on the panel
after oral arguments. The decision with the most votes becomes the majority position, and the
judges in the majority then have to decide who is going to author the associated opinion. By cus-
tom, the most senior acting judge in the majority assigns the responsibility of writing, taking into
consideration expertise, work load, and other factors (Bowie et al., 2014). The majority opinion
articulates the principles behind the decision, which are binding law for lower courts (Rohde and
Spaeth, 1976): the authoring of the opinion itself is an important task. Given the policy stakes of
opinion assignment, a relevant question is whether the preferences of the senior judges affect this
procedure. In particular, we investigate whether slanted senior judges are differentially likely to
assign majority opinions to female judges.
In particular, we estimate the following specification:
Female Authorictj = βGender SlantSENIORj + X
SENIOR′
j γ+ δct + ε ictj (3)
where Female Authorictj is a dummy equal to 1 if the author of the majority opinion of case i in
circuit c in year t decided by a panel with senior judge j is a female judge, Gender SlantSENIORj is the
gender slant (standardized cosine similarity between the gender and career-family dimensions) of
the most senior judge on the panel, XSENIORj are demographic characteristics of the senior judge
(gender, party of nominating president, race, religion, region of birth, cohort of birth, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to appointment), and δct are circuit-
year fixed effects. The dataset includes one observation for each case. Standard errors are clustered
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at the senior judge level.23
For opinion assignment to a female or a male judge to be a meaningful decision, we drop per
curiam (unsigned) opinions and restrict the sample to cases that have at least one female judge on
the panel.24 Since the decision to dissent or concur is possibly endogeneous, we also exclude cases
that contain either a dissent or a concurrence.25
Table 4 reports the estimated effect of the gender slant of the assigning judge on the whether
the authoring judge is female. Column (1) estimates the baseline specification. When the most
senior judge on the panel has higher slant by one standard deviation, the majority opinion is less
likely to be authored by one of the female judges by 1.7 percentage points, corresponding to a
4.5% decrease over the baseline probability.26,27 If the senior judge is a woman instead, there is
13.4 percentage points (35%) higher probability that the author of the opinion is a woman. While
slant has a non-trivial effect on the gender of the authoring judge, the magnitude of the effect is
substantially smaller than that of being female.
Column (2) shows that the result is unchanged when we include interacted controls. The result
is not significant when we condition on “career fixed effects,” but the magnitude of the effect is
comparable to that of the baseline specification (Column (3)). In addition, if we use a gender slant
measure calculated based on embeddings trained excluding gender-related cases, the result is the
same (column (4)). In short, judges with stronger stereotypical association towards gender are less
likely to assign an important career-relevant task to female judges.
Robustness Checks. Appendix Table 12 shows that the result is robust to a number of ad-
ditional specification checks. As before, in column (1) we control for the share of clerks that are
female and find that it limitedly affects the main result: while the coefficient is no longer statisti-
cally significant – possibly because we have information on clerks only for a subset of the judges –
23We determine the most senior judge on the panel using information on the career of appellate judges, and exclude
from the analysis cases for which we could not precisely determine who the identity of the most senior judge on the
case, mainly because of there being multiple judges appointed in the same year.
24 In Appendix Table 11 we check whether the gender slant of the panel’s senior judge affects the probability of
having a specific author (columns (1) and (2)) or having a per curiam opinion (columns (3) and (4)), and find no effect.
25In Appendix Table 11, we show that the slant of the most senior judge on the panel does not impact the probability
of unanimous decisions – that is, having dissents or concurrences (columns (5) and (6)). We looked at the effect of
gender slant on probability of dissenting against or concurring with female judges and did not find any effect.
26Female judges are on average assigned opinions at the same rate as male judges. The baseline probability shown
here is higher than 0.33 because we include panels with one, two or three female judges.
27Appendix Figure 7 shows a binned scatterplot of the main relationship between gender slant and opinion assign-
ment, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects.
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it is very similar in magnitude. Reassuringly, in column (2) we show that the placebo association
between gender and positive/negative attributes does not predict opinion assignment to a female
judge. Column (3) shows that the result is not driven by confounded ideology of judges: if we
control for a measure of how conservative a judge’s voting record is, the coefficient on slant is
unchanged.
Given the large effect of the senior judge being female on the probability that the authoring
judge is a woman and that female judges have lower gender slant, we might worry that self-
assignments are the driver behind the main effect. Column (4) shows that this is not the case: if
we re-estimate the main specification excluding cases where the most senior judge on the panel is
a woman, we find the same effect. Column (5) shows instead that the main result is not sensitive
to the inclusion of cases that had dissents or concurrences. Finally, Appendix Figure 11 shows
that the results are robust to using different word sets to identify the gender and career-family
dimensions.
Assignment of Different Types of Cases. This result raises the question of whether slanted
judges also assign different types of cases to female judges. In Appendix A.10, we look but do
not find evidence of any differences. The cases assigned to female judges by higher-slant judges
are not concentrated in specific areas of the law and do not have different expected importance,
as proxied by predicted forward citations (based on case characteristics), which is potentially an
interesting result in light of the literature on discrimination in task assignments.
6.2 Effect of Gender Slant on Disparities in Reversals
District court trials are presided by a single judge and, similarly to the Appellate Level, cases are
assigned to district judges quasi-randomly within each district year. Up to 40% of district cases are
appealed and are therefore considered by circuit courts (Eisenberg, 2004). Importantly, reversals
matter for career outcomes: as shown in Appendix Figure 15, district judges that see a higher
share of their decisions reversed on appeal are less likely to be promoted to Circuit Courts.
Here, we ask whether judges with higher gender slant are differentially likely to reverse deci-
sions authored by female district court judges. The empirical strategy we employ in this section is
slightly different than the rest of the paper, although it also builds on quasi-random assignment of
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circuit judges to cases and on conditioning on observable characteristics. In particular, we identify
the effect of slant on reversals using a differences-in-differences design that compares appealed
cases decided by female and male district judges that are assigned to circuit judges with differ-
ent levels of gender slant. The identification assumption requires that cases originally decided by
a male district judge and assigned to circuit judges with different level of slant provide a good
control group for cases that were originally decided by a female district judge. The quasi-random
assignment of cases to panels at the circuit level helps us in this respect: cases assigned to higher
or lower slant are comparable. Importantly, the identification strategy allows for cases decided
by female and male judges to be different, because they are appealed at different rates, as long
as there is no systematic assignment of cases to higher and lower slant judges based on the likely
reversal outcome.
We estimate the following baseline specification:
Voted to Reversejictk =piFemale District Judgek ∗ Gender Slantj
+ Female District Judgek ∗ X′jγ+ δct + δk + δj + ε jictk
(4)
where Voted to Reverseidτctj is an indicator variable equal to 1 if circuit judge j voted to reverse
the district court decision in case i in circuit c in year t, originally decided by district judge k. On
the right-hand side, Gender Slantj is the slant (standardized cosine similarity between the gender
and career-family dimensions) of circuit judge j, Female District Judgek is a dummy equal to 1 if
the district judge is female, Xj are demographic controls for the circuit court judge (gender, party
of nominating president, race, religion, region of birth, cohort of birth, law school attended, and
whether the judge had federal experience prior to appointment), δct are circuit-year fixed effects,
δk are district judge fixed effects, and δj are circuit judge fixed effects. The dataset includes one
observation for the vote of each judge in each case. Standard errors are clustered at the circuit
judge level.
The inclusion of the circuit-year fixed effects δct ensures comparability of cases assigned to
higher and lower slanted judges because of quasi-random assignment of cases to judges, while
as before, controlling for the demographic characteristics Xj shows that gender slant matters in-
dependently of other judge characteristics. The inclusion of district judge fixed effects δk ensures
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that we are comparing what happens when cases decided at the district court level by the same
judge are assigned to circuit judges with higher and lower slant. Finally, the circuit judge fixed
effects δj allow for circuit judges to differ in their baseline probabilty of reversing a district court
decision.
Table 5 column (1) shows the estimates from the baseline specification. Circuit judges with
a one standard deviation higher slant are 1 percentage point (5.6%) more likely to vote to re-
verse a district court decision if the district judge is female, relative to when the district judge is
male. Other characteristics of the circuit judge do not make a difference: being appointed by a
Democratic President or being female is unrelated to disparately voting to reverse female district
judges.28 Interestingly, female district judges are 2.3 percentage points less likely to be reversed,
and we observe gender slant to go against this gradient.
The result is robust to controlling for two-way interactions between the district judge being
female and the circuit judge being female and Democratic (column (2)), and to including district-
year fixed effects which are not needed for identification but might increase precision (column
(3)). In addition, using a gender slant measure calculated based on embeddings trained excluding
gender-related cases barely affects the coefficient (column (4)).
Robustness Checks. Appendix Table 14 shows that the main effect on reversals is robust to a
number of additional robustness checks. In particular, controlling for the share of female clerks
(column (1)), including a placebo association between gender and positive/negative attributes
(column (2)), and controlling for the circuit judge’s vote record in ideologically divisive (column
(3)) do not make a difference. In addition, column (4) shows that the main effect is stable to
restricting the sample to the post-1980 period when there were likely to be more female district
judges. Appendix Figure 12 shows that the results are robust to using different word sets to
identify the gender and career-family dimensions.
Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation. Given that reversals have a negative effect on district
judges’ promotion, slant has the potential to hinder the career progression of female district judges
with respect to male district judges. Using estimates on the effect of reversals on the probability
that district judges get elevated to Appellate Courts, we can try to estimate the magnitude of this
28Appendix Figure 7 shows a binned scatterplot of the main relationship between gender slant and reversals sepa-
rately by gender of the district judge, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects. It appears that
low slant judges are less likely to reverse female judges with respect to males.
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effect in a back-of-the-envelope calculation. In particular, we find that a female judge whose ap-
pealed decisions were assigned to circuit judges with on average a one standard deviation higher
slant would be 6.3% less likely to be elevated than a male judge faced with similarly slanted circuit
judges.29
6.3 Effect of Gender Slant on Disparities in Citations
The last career-related outcome we examine are citations. Law depends on precedent, and de-
ciding which cases to cite in a specific opinion is a non-trivial decision: “Judges [and] lawyers
who brief and argue cases [...] could all be thought, with only slight exaggeration, to make their
living in part by careful citation of judicial decisions” (Posner, 2000). Meanwhile, many judges
admit to monitoring and caring about whether they are cited by other judges (Posner, 2008), and
citations to cases are commonly understood as a measure of judge quality (Ash and MacLeod,
2015). This measure is therefore relevant to judicial careers, and differential treatment of male
and female judges in citation choices presents another potential domain for high-stakes discrimi-
nation. In this section we analyze this type of differential treatment: are gender attitudes among
judges reflected in their decisions about which precedents to cite in their opinions? In particular,
we ask whether judges with higher gender slant are differentially likely to cite opinions authored
by female judges.
Identification once again relies on random assignment of cases to judge panels. Conditional
on circuit-year fixed effects, cases assigned to different panels are comparable. However, choice
of authorship is endogenous. Even if the fact that we control for a number of judge characteristics
improves comparability across judges, it is possible that judges with higher gender slant are sys-
tematically assigned authorship of cases for which it would be optimal to differentially cite female
judges: the results in this sections have to be interpreted carefully.
The specification we estimate is:
Cites Female Judgeictj = βGender Slantj + X
′
jγ+ δct + ε (5)
29In fact, Appendix Table 15 shows that an increase from 0 to 1 in the share of votes to reverse the district court
decision on appeal implies a 38 percentage points decrease in the probability of being elevated. The calculation follows
from the fact that female district judges have around a 6.8% baseline probability of being elevated. Interestingly, the
relationship between reversals and promotions is not differential by gender of the district judge.
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where Cites Female Judgeictj is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion of case i authored by
judge j in circuit c during year t cites at least one opinion authored by a female judge, Gender Slantj
is the slant (standardized cosine similarity between the gender and career-family dimensions) of
judge j, Xj are demographic characteristics of judge j (gender, party of nominating president, race,
religion, region of birth, cohort of birth, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal
experience prior to appointment), and δct are circuit-year fixed effects. The dataset includes one
observation for each case, and is restricted to cases in which the opinion was authored by a specific
judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
Table 6 shows the estimates from Equation (5) on how gender slant affects the probability of
citing at least one female judge. Column (1) reports the estimates from the baseline specification.
Judges with a one standard deviation higher gender slant are 1 percentage point less likely to cite
any opinions authored by female judges. The effect is significant at the 10% level, and relatively
small in magnitude (2.6% of the outcome mean), especially if compared to the effect of the author
being a woman (12.8 percentage points or 34%). Including interacted controls does not affect the
result (column (2)), and neither does including career fixed effects (column (3)). However, the
result is not statistically robust to using gender slant measured on embeddings trained excluding
gender-related cases (column (4)).30
Robustness Checks. Appendix Table 16 elaborates on the robustness of the main effect on
citations with different specifications and sample restrictions. The main effect is not robust to
controlling for the share of female clerks (column (1)), perhaps because clerks are important when
determining decisions or simply because of the smaller sample size. Instead, including the placebo
association between gender and positive/negative attributes (column (2)) and controlling for the
circuit judge’s vote record in ideologically divisive (column (3)) limitedly impact the main coeffi-
cient. In addition, column (4) shows that the main effect is stable to restricting the sample to the
post-1980 period when there were likely to be more female district judges.
As with opinion assignment, the large effect of being a female judge on citations suggests that
the result might be explained by self-citations. Even when we define the outcome excluding self-
cites, however, gender slant has a negative and statistically significant at the 10% level on the
30Appendix Figure 9 shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between gender slant and citations, conditional
on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects.
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probability of citing a female judge. Interestingly, however, when self-cites are excluded, female
judges appear to be less likely to cite other female judges. Finally, the effect is robust to using
different word sets (Appendix Figure 13). Overall, judges with higher gender slant appear to
be less likely to cite opinions authored by female judges, although the effect is less robust than
other findings presented in the paper and should be interpreted with special caution because of
potential endogeneity.
6.4 Other Judge Characteristics Besides Gender
To strengthen the argument that lexical gender slant is indeed proxying for gender preferences,
we explore whether gender slant also affects treatment of judges with different demographic char-
acteristics – namely, political leanings, minority status, and age.
Opinion Assignment. First, Appendix Table 17 explores the effect of gender slant of the
most senior judge of the panel on opinion assigment to whether the authoring judge is Demo-
crat, whether the authoring judge is minority, and the age of the authoring judge. We find that
judges with higher slant are not differentially likely to assign the opinion of the court to a Demo-
cratic judge (column (1)), which is reassuring that the measure is indeed a meaningful proxy for
attitudes toward gender specifically. Consistent with this idea, columns (2) and (3) show that slant
does not impact the probability of the judge assigning the opinion to a minority judge, or by the
age of the judge.
Reversals. Second, we check whether judges with higher gender slant are also more likely to
reverse decisions of district judges with different characteristics. Appendix Table 18 shows that
when circuit judges with higher slant decide on cases of district judges that were appointed by a
Democratic President, they are not differentially likely to reverse them than cases of district judges
that were appointed by a Republican President (column (1)). Circuit judges with higher slant,
however, appear more likely to reverse cases in which the district judge is a minority (column (2)).
Citations. Finally, Appendix Table 19 shows that judges with higher gender slant are less likely
to cite opinions authored by Democrat-appointed judges (column (1)). Instead, gender slant does
not affect the probability of citing minority judges (column (2)) or the average age of the judges
cited (column (3)). Interestingly, judges with higher slant are more likely to cite opinions authored
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by judges with higher slant as well, and this pattern is not due to judge gender or party.
Overall, these results suggest that gender is the salient characteristic to which judges with
higher gender slant respond: gender slant specifically proxies for attitudes towards women.
7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of stereotypical gender attitudes in U.S. Circuit Courts. We find
that stereotypical attitudes, at least as far as they are expressed in judicial writing, matter. Judges
with higher gender slant vote more conservatively on women’s-rights cases, are less likely to
assign opinions to women, are more likely to reverse district courts decisions when the district
judge is a woman, and cite fewer opinions authored by female judges.
These findings add to the literature on gender attitudes by showing that they matter even for
skilled professionals making high-stakes, public-oriented decisions. Our text-based metric is a
proxy for a psychological factor, and so the policy implications of the results should be considered
with caution. We doubt, for example, that forcing judges to use less stereotypical language would
causally shift their decisions in gender law or their behavior toward female colleagues.
This research can be extended in a number of directions. First, it would be important to know
how well text-based measures of gender attitudes correlate with other measures, such as scores on
the implicit association test. Second, the text-based metrics could be computed for other decision-
makers such as politicians, journalists, and professors. In these domains, as with judges, there are
no traditional measures of stereotypes, but large corpora of text are available.
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Figure 1: Identifying a Gender Dimension in a Vector Space
woman man
girl boy
queen king
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Notes: The figure exemplifies how a gender dimension can be identified in a vector space based on the difference between vectors
representing male and female words.
Figure 2: Measuring Gender Stereotypes using Cosine Similarity
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Notes: The figures exemplify how gender slant varies depending on the relative position of the gender and career/family dimensions
in the vector space.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Gender Slant
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of the slant measure for the 139 judges in the sample. The vertical lines indicate the gender
slant of a sample of Supreme Court justices who were appointed after 1970 and have a corpus of at least 1,000,000 tokens. The gender
slant of Supreme Court justices is measured by training embeddings on the Supreme Court majority opinions that were authored by
them.
Figure 4: Judge-Specific Word Embeddings Capture Gender Information
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Notes: The graph shows that the gender dimension in judge-specific word embeddings captures gender information when the corpus
of the judge is sufficiently large. In particular, we test whether male first names have a higher cosine similarity with the gender
dimension than female names in the judge-specific embeddings. The graph reports the cumulative distribution of the t-statistics
resulting from a series of regressions of an indicator variable equal to 1 if the name is male on the median cosine similarity between
the vector representing the name and the gender dimension across bootstrap samples for each judge, by number of tokens included
in the judge’s corpus. We focus on the most common 25 male and female names according to the 1990 Population Census. The graph
shows that for almost all judges with at least 1,500,000 tokens, there is a positive and significant at the 5% level correlation between the
gender connotation of a name and a dummy indicating the correct gender, while this is not the case for judges with smaller corpora.
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Figure 5: Gender Slant, by Party and Gender
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Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the slant measure, by party of nominating President (graph to the left) and by judge gender
(graph to the right).
Figure 6: Share of Circuit Judges who are Female, 1890-2010
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Notes: The graph shows the share of Circuit Judges belonging to the original ten circuits who are female in each year 1890-2010.
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Table 1: Word Sets
Male his, he, him, mr, himself, man, men, king, male, fellow
Female her, she, ms, women, woman, female, herself, girl, girls, queen
Career company, inc, work, business, service, pay, corp, employee, employment, benefits
Family family, wife, husband, mother, father, parents, son, brother, parent, brothers
Table 2: Correlates of Gender Slant
Dependent Variable Gender Slant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democrat -0.027 -0.003 0.083
(0.172) (0.178) (0.269)
Female -0.502* -0.592*** -0.713**
(0.288) (0.202) (0.276)
Minority -0.098 -0.164 0.453
(0.329) (0.194) (0.283)
Born in 1920s -0.069 0.080 0.152
(0.191) (0.208) (0.299)
Born in 1930s -0.765*** -0.740*** -0.606*
(0.203) (0.234) (0.336)
Born after 1940 -0.537** -0.558** -0.381
(0.229) (0.258) (0.338)
Daughter -0.490*
(0.275)
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 98
Outcome Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.085
Adjusted R2 -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.087 0.440 0.529
Circuit FE X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X
Number of Children FE X
Notes: The table shows the correlation between judges’ demographic characteristics and gender slant. We regress slant on demo-
graphic controls in separate regressions (columns (1) to (4)) and in a multivariate regression that includes additional controls and
circuit fixed effects (column (5)). The additional controls are region of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had
federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The omitted category for judge cohort are judges born before 1920.
In column (6) we additionally include an indicator variable for having at least one daughter, and number of children fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust. Data on judges’ family composition is from Glynn and Sen (2015). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in Gender-Related Cases
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Democrat -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.135*** -0.147***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
Female -0.033 -0.060 -0.018 -0.035
(0.033) (0.053) (0.025) (0.034)
Observations 3086 3086 3086 3086
Clusters 113 113 113 113
Outcome Mean 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Issue FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Career FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on decisions in gender-related cases (cases related to reproductive rights, gender
discrimination, and sexual harassment). We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conservatively in a gender-
related case on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, circuit-year fixed effects, and dataset-specific issue fixed effects.
Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and
whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2) additionally controls for two-
way interactions of gender, party and race. Column (3) includes instead "career fixed effects", which are indicator variables equal to 1 if
the judge sat on at least one panel in a given circuit over a given 25-year period. Column (4) calculates gender slant using embeddings
trained excluding gender-related cases. The dataset includes one observation for the vote of each judge in each case, and data on votes
on gender-related cases are from Epstein et al. (2013)’s update of Sunstein’s (2006) data and Glynn and Sen (2015). Standard errors are
clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Author Gender
Dependent Variable Author is Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant -0.017** -0.016* -0.014 -0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Democrat -0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Female 0.134*** 0.178*** 0.158*** 0.137***
(0.016) (0.044) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 32052 32052 32052 32052
Clusters 125 125 125 125
Outcome Mean 0.383 0.383 0.383 0.383
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Career FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the effect of the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, who is in charge of assigning opinion
authorship, on the gender of the judge authoring the majority decision. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the authoring
judge is female on the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, demographic controls for the most senior judge, and circuit-
year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2) additonally
controls for two-way interactions of gender, party and race. Column (3) controls instead for "career fixed effects", which are indicator
variables equal to 1 if the judge sat on at least one panel in a given circuit over a given 25-year period. Column (4) calculates gender
slant using embeddings trained excluding gender-related cases. The dataset includes one observation for each case. The sample is
restricted to cases with a specific author, with at least one female judge on the panel, and that were decided unanimously. Standard
errors are clustered at the senior judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
42
Table 5: Differential Effect of Gender Slant on Reversals of District Court Cases by Gender of
District Judge
Dependent Variable Votes to Reverse District Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant * Female District Judge 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democrat * Female District Judge -0.010 -0.013** -0.010 -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Female * Female District Judge -0.003 -0.047** -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 145862 145862 145563 145862
Clusters 133 133 133 133
Outcome Mean for Male Judges 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180
Outcome Mean for Female Judges 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Judge FE X X X X
District Judge FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
District-Year FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the differential effect of gender slant on the probability of reversal of decisions of male and female District
Judges. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge votes to reverse the district decision on the gender slant of the judge
interacted with an indicator variable for whether the district judge is female, demographic controls interacted with an indicator vari-
able for whether the district judge is female, judge fixed effects, district judge fixed effects and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic
controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge
had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2) additionally controls for two-way interactions of
gender, party and race. Column (3) includes district-year fixed effects. Column (4) calculates gender slant using embeddings trained
excluding gender-related cases. The dataset includes one observation for the vote of each judge in each case. The sample is restricted
to cases for which we were able to determine the identity of the district judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Effect of Gender Slant on the Probability of Citing a Female Judge
Dependent Variable Cites at Least One Female Judge
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant -0.010* -0.009* -0.013* -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Democrat -0.012 -0.017 -0.018* -0.011
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Female 0.128*** 0.109* 0.139*** 0.131***
(0.016) (0.058) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 107923 107923 107923 107923
Clusters 139 139 139 139
Outcome Mean 0.383 0.383 0.383 0.383
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Career FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on the probability of citing at least one female judge. We regress a dummy equal
to 1 if the majority opinion cites at least one case authored by a woman on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls and
circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion,
law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2)
additionally controls for two-way interactions of gender, party and race. Column (3) includes instead "career fixed effects", which are
indicator variables equal to 1 if the judge sat on at least one case in a given circuit over a 25-year period. Column (4) calculates gender
slant using embeddings trained excluding gender-related cases. The dataset includes one observation for each case. The sample is
restricted to cases in which the opinion is authored by a specific judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Appendix
A.1 Alternative Stereotypical Dimensions
Appendix Table 1: Median Word Count by Concept
Concept Median Word Count
Male 1,114,493
Female 24,563
Career 359,683.5
Family 44,925
Positive 43,651
Negative 73,200
Art 12,399
Science 5,117.5
Notes: The table shows the median number of times that words used to define the gender, career/family, positive/negative, and
art/science dimensions appear in the full judicial corpus.
Appendix Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Gender Slant based on the Association Considered
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Notes: The graph shows the empirical cumulative distribution of gender slant measured using the stereotypical association between
males and career versus female and family as opposed to the stereotypical association between male and positive attributes versus
female and negative attributes. The distibution comes for the 24 repetitions of bootstrapped embeddings for the full judicial corpus.
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A.2 Correlation of Gender Slant for Embeddings Trained using Different Parameters
A key hyperparameter for GloVe is the window size for computing co-occurence statistics. Here,
we show that gender slant measures obtained from embeddings estimated using a 5, 10, or 15 win-
dow size are highly correlated. In particular, the two scatterplots below illustrate the correlation
between the baseline gender slant measure we use in the paper, obtained using a 10 window size,
and gender slant obtained using a 5 word window size (graph to the left) or a 15 word window
size (graph to the right). Both scatterplots are clustered around the 45 degree line, which illus-
trates the strong correlation across the measures, although it is worth noting that the correlation is
lower for smaller window sizes than for larger ones. Similarly, training lower (100- as opposed to
300-) dimensional embeddings leaves the gender slant measure almost unchanged.
Appendix Figure 2: Correlation of Gender Slant for Embeddings of Different Window Sizes
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(b) Window of 15 Words
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Notes: The graphs show a scatter plot of the gender slant measure obtained by training embeddings using different window sizes to
construct the co-occurrence matrix.
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Appendix Figure 3: Correlation of Gender Slant for Embeddings of Different Dimensions
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
G
en
de
r 
S
la
nt
 f
or
 1
00
 D
im
en
si
on
s
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Gender Slant
Notes: The graph shows a scatter plot of the gender slant measure obtained by training 100-dimensional and 300-dimensional embed-
dings.
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A.3 Non-Gender Specific Language and Gender Slant
Appendix Figure 4: Non-Gender Specific Language and Gender Slant
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Notes: The graph shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between use of non-gender specific language (e.g. "himself or helself",
"he or she") and gender slant, conditional on total size of the corpus (log number of tokens).
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A.4 Randomization
Appendix Figure 5: Randomization Check
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Notes: The graph shows the cumulative distribution of the t-statistics from a series of regressions of an indicator variable for a given
topic on the gender slant of the judge and circuit-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered are the judge level.
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A.5 Binscatter Plots
Appendix Figure 6: Gender Slant and Decisions in Gender-Related Cases
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Notes: The graph shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between gender slant and the probability that a judge votes conserva-
tively in a gender-related case, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender,
party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal expe-
rience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court.
Appendix Figure 7: Assigning-Judge Gender Slant and Author Gender
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Notes: The graph shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, who
is in charge of assigning opinion authorship, and the gender of the authoring judge, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-
year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to
cases with a specific author, with at least one female judge on the panel, and that were decided unanimously.
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Appendix Figure 8: Gender Slant and Reversals, by District Judge Gender
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Notes: The graph shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between gender slant and the probability of voting to reverse the
district court decision by the gender of the district judge, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects. Demo-
graphic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether
the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases for which we were
able to determine the identity of the district judge.
Appendix Figure 9: Gender Slant and Probability of Citing a Female Judge
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Notes: The graph shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between gender slant and the probability of citing at least one female
judge, conditional on demographic controls and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing
President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being
appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases in which the opinion is authored by a specific judge.
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A.6 Robustness to Different Word Choice
An important choice we made when constructing the lexical gender slant measure was which
words to use to identify the gender and career-family dimension in the word embedding space.
As we explain in Section 2.3, we followed a principled procedure which selected the words from
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Dictionary associated with a given concept that appeared
more frequently in the judicial corpus.
In this section, we explore how the main results of the paper are affected by perturbation of
the word sets used. First, we show how the results are affected if we choose the top 5 to top 15
most frequent words appearing in the judicial corpus. Second, we show how the results change
if we drop one word used to identify the career-family dimension at the time. Overall, the results
appear to be robust to the choice of words used to identify the two dimensions.
Appendix Figure 10: Effect of Gender Slant on Gender-Related Decisions, Robustness to Word Set
Choice
(a) Robustness to Size of Word Set
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(b) Robustness to Dropping Attribute Words
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Notes: The graphs show how the effect of gender slant on decisions in gender-related cases varies based on the word sets used to
identify the gender and attribute dimension. The graph on the left shows robustness to using word sets of different sizes; the graph on
the right shows robustness to dropping one attribute word at the time. The graphs show the coefficient on gender slant, together with
95% confidence intervals. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conservatively in gender-related cases on the
gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing
President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being
appointed to an Appellate Court. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
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Appendix Figure 11: Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Author Gender, Robustness to
Word Set Choice
(a) Robustness to Size of Word Set
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(b) Robustness to Dropping Attribute Words
-.
04
-.
03
-.
02
-.
01
0
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
95
%
 C
on
fi
de
nc
e 
In
te
rv
al
s
no
ne
co
mp
an
y inc
wo
rk
bu
sin
es
s
se
rv
ice pa
y
co
rp
em
plo
ye
e
em
plo
ym
en
t
be
ne
fit
s
fam
ily wi
fe
hu
sb
an
d
mo
the
r
fat
he
r
pa
ren
ts so
n
br
oth
er
pa
ren
t
br
oth
ers
Attribute Word Being Dropped
Notes: The graphs show how the effect of the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, who is in charge of assigning opinion
authorship, on the gender of the authoring judge varies based on the word sets used to identify the gender and attribute dimension.
The graph on the left shows robustness to using word sets of different sizes; the graph on the right shows robustness to dropping one
attribute word at the time. The graphs show the coefficient on gender slant, together with 95% confidence intervals. We regress an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion is assigned to a female author on the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel,
demographic controls, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth,
cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate
Court. The sample is restricted to cases with a specific author, with at least one female judge on the panel, and that were decided
unanimously. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
Appendix Figure 12: Differential Effect of Gender Slant on Reversals in District Court Cases by
Gender of District Judge, Robustness to Word Set Choice
(a) Robustness to Size of Word Set
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(b) Robustness to Dropping Attribute Words
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
95
%
 C
on
fi
de
nc
e 
In
te
rv
al
s
no
ne
co
mp
an
y inc
wo
rk
bu
sin
es
s
se
rv
ice pa
y
co
rp
em
plo
ye
e
em
plo
ym
en
t
be
ne
fit
s
fam
ily wi
fe
hu
sb
an
d
mo
the
r
fat
he
r
pa
ren
ts so
n
br
oth
er
pa
ren
t
br
oth
ers
Attribute Word Being Dropped
Notes: The graphs show how the effect of gender slant on probability of reversal of district court judges of different genders varies
based on the word sets used to identify the gender and attribute dimension. The graph on the left shows robustness to using word sets
of different sizes; the graph on the right shows robustness to dropping one attribute word at the time. The graphs show the coefficient
on gender slant interacted with an indicator variable for whether the district judge is female, together with 95% confidence intervals.
We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge voted to reverse the district decision on the gender slant of the judge interacted
with an indicator variable for whether the district judge is female, demographic controls interacted with an indicator variable for
whether the district judge is female, judge fixed effects, district judge fixed effects and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls
are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had
federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases for which we were able to
determine the gender of the district judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
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Appendix Figure 13: Effect of Gender Slant on the Probability of Citing a Female Judge, Robust-
ness to Word Set Choice
(a) Robustness to Size of Word Set
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(b) Robustness to Dropping Attribute Words
-.
02
-.
01
5
-.
01
-.
00
5
0
.0
05
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
95
%
 C
on
fi
de
nc
e 
In
te
rv
al
s
no
ne
co
mp
an
y inc
wo
rk
bu
sin
es
s
se
rv
ice pa
y
co
rp
em
plo
ye
e
em
plo
ym
en
t
be
ne
fit
s
fam
ily wi
fe
hu
sb
an
d
mo
the
r
fat
he
r
pa
ren
ts so
n
br
oth
er
pa
ren
t
br
oth
ers
Attribute Word Being Dropped
Notes: The graphs show how the effect of the gender slant of the author of the opinion on the probability of citing at least one female
judge varies based on the word sets used to identify the gender and attribute dimension. The graph on the left shows robustness to
using word sets of different sizes; the graph on the right shows robustness to dropping one attribute word at the time. The graphs
show the coefficient on gender slant, together with 95% confidence intervals. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion
cites at least one female judge on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic
controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the
judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases in which the opinion is
authored by a specific judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
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A.7 Oster (2019) Test for Selection on Unobservables
Our identification strategy relies on two assumptions: first, random assignment of judges to cases
– which ensures that gender slant is not systematically related to the outcome; and second, on
conditioning on a detailed set of observable characteristics – which ensures that gender slant is
not proxying for other characteristics of the judge (other than gender preferences). Of course,
judges with different levels of gender slant might still be different according to some unobservable
characteristic. In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence on the extent to which this
is an issue by implementing the test proposed by Oster (2019). The test assesses the amount of
selection on unobservables that is plausible in a setting by looking at the change in the coefficient
of interest from an uncontrolled regression to a regression that includes all controls, scaled by the
change in R2.
The tables below report the coefficient from the uncontrolled regression (column (1)), where
we drop the demographic controls for the judge, and the coefficient from the controlled regression
(column (2)). We perform the test for three different levels of Rmax, which is the R2 of a regression
that included all unobservable charactestics. Based on the recommendations in Oster (2019), we
consider three different values of Rmax: 1.5, 2, and 5 times the R2 of the controlled regression. For
each value of Rmax, we then compute the degree of selection on unobservables as a proportion of
the selection on observables that would be needed to obtain a bias-adjusted coefficient equal to 0.
Overall, selection of unobservables does not appear to be a major concern. The exception is
the effect of gender slant on citations, where the bias-adjusted treatment effect would be zero if
selection on unobservable were only half as large as the amount of selection on observables.
55
Appendix Table 2: Oster Test: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in Gender-Related Cases
β Uncontrolled β Controlled Rmax δ for β = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.041 -0.042 0.057 3.734
0.076 1.990
0.190 0.524
Notes: The table shows the results from applying the method proposed by Oster (2019) to assess bias from unobservables based
on selection on observables. Column (1) shows the estimate of the coefficient on gender slant from the uncontrolled specification,
in which we drop the demographic characteristics of the judge. Column (2) shows the estimate of the coefficient from the baseline
specification (equation (2)). Column (3) shows the value of Rmax for which δ (column (4)) is computed. δ is the degree of selection on
unobservables as a proportion of the selection on observables that would be needed to obtain a bias-adjusted coefficient equal to 0.
Appendix Table 3: Oster Test: Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Author Gender
β Uncontrolled β Controlled Rmax δ for β = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.028 -0.017 0.025 0.877
0.033 0.445
0.082 0.113
Notes: The table shows the results from applying the method proposed by Oster (2019) to assess bias from unobservables based
on selection on observables. Column (1) shows the estimate of the coefficient on gender slant from the uncontrolled specification,
in which we drop the demographic characteristics of the judge. Column (2) shows the estimate of the coefficient from the baseline
specification (equation (3)). Column (3) shows the value of Rmax for which δ (column (4)) is computed. Rmax is set to be 1.5, 2, or 5
times the adjusted R2 from the baseline specification. δ is the degree of selection on unobservables as a proportion of the selection on
observables that would be needed to obtain a bias-adjusted coefficient equal to 0.
Appendix Table 4: Oster Test: Differential Effect of Gender Slant on Reversals of District Court
Cases by Gender of District Judge
β Uncontrolled β Controlled Rmax δ for β = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.006 0.010 0.000 43.772
0.000 16.585
0.001 4.529
Notes: The table shows the results from applying the method proposed by Oster (2019) to assess bias from unobservables based
on selection on observables. Column (1) shows the estimate of the coefficient on gender slant from the uncontrolled specification,
in which we drop the demographic characteristics of the judge. Column (2) shows the estimate of the coefficient from the baseline
specification (equation (3)). Column (3) shows the value of Rmax for which δ (column (4)) is computed. Rmax is set to be 1.5, 2, or 5
times the adjusted R2 from the baseline specification. δ is the degree of selection on unobservables as a proportion of the selection on
observables that would be needed to obtain a bias-adjusted coefficient equal to 0.
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Appendix Table 5: Oster Test: Effect of Gender Slant on Probability of Citing a Female Judge
β Uncontrolled β Controlled Rmax δ for β = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.024 -0.010 0.022 0.670
0.030 0.338
0.074 0.085
Notes: The table shows the results from applying the method proposed by Oster (2019) to assess bias from unobservables based
on selection on observables. Column (1) shows the estimate of the coefficient on gender slant from the uncontrolled specification,
in which we drop the demographic characteristics of the judge. Column (2) shows the estimate of the coefficient from the baseline
specification (equation (3)). Column (3) shows the value of Rmax for which δ (column (4)) is computed. Rmax is set to be 1.5, 2, or 5
times the adjusted R2 from the baseline specification. δ is the degree of selection on unobservables as a proportion of the selection on
observables that would be needed to obtain a bias-adjusted coefficient equal to 0.
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A.8 Additional Results on Judicial Decisions
Appendix Table 6: Oster Test: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in Gender-Related Cases, by
Dataset
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
Dataset Epstein et al. (2013) Data Glynn-Sen (2015) Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender Slant 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.043* 0.051* 0.044
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035)
Democrat -0.145*** -0.152*** -0.134*** -0.078 -0.100* -0.134**
(0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057)
Female -0.054 -0.073 -0.044* 0.029 -0.101 0.080
(0.033) (0.058) (0.026) (0.058) (0.069) (0.066)
Observations 2335 2335 2335 738 738 738
Clusters 112 112 112 104 104 104
Outcome Mean 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.675 0.675 0.675
Circuit-Year FE X X X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X X
Career FE X X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on decisions in gender-related cases separately by dataset. We regress an indicator
variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conservatively in a gender-related case on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and
circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion,
law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Columns (2) and
(5) additionally control for two-way interactions of gender, party and race. Columns (3) and (6) include instead "career fixed effects",
which are indicator variables equal to 1 if the judge sayon at least one panel in a given circuit in a given 25-year period. Standard
errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 7: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in Gender-Related Cases, Additional Ro-
bustness Checks
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Slant 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Democrat -0.156*** -0.143*** -0.137***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.027)
Female -0.004 -0.026 -0.031
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Share Female Clerks 0.006
(0.088)
Association Between Gender and Positive/Negative Attributes -0.026
(0.033)
Conservative Score (Epstein et al. 2013) 0.062
(0.098)
Observations 2348 3086 3078
Clusters 72 113 111
Outcome Mean 0.612 0.606 0.606
Circuit-Year FE X X X
Topic FE X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on decisions in gender-related cases with additiona controls. We regress an indicator
variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conservatively in a gender-related case on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and
circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion,
law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (1)
additionally controls for the share of clerks that are female. Column (2) additionally controls for the standardized cosine similarity
between the gender and career-family dimensions. The conservative score in column (3) is defined as the average share of conservative
votes of the judge in non gender-related cases from the Epstein et al. (2013) data. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 8: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in Non-Gender-Related Cases
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
Dataset Epstein et al. (2013) Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant 0.027** 0.032*** 0.004 0.018*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Democrat -0.070*** -0.096*** -0.059*** -0.070***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
Female -0.060** -0.255*** -0.075*** -0.067***
(0.026) (0.050) (0.020) (0.024)
Observations 5477 5477 5477 5477
Clusters 112 112 112 112
Outcome Mean 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Career FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on decisions in non-gender-related cases. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1
if a judge voted conservatively in a non-gender-related case on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and circuit-year
fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2) additionally
controls for two-way interactions of gender, party and race. Column (3) includes instead "career fixed effects", which are indicator
variabels equal to 1 if the judge sat on at least one panel in a given circuit over a give 25-year period. Standard errors are clustered at
the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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We test whether gender slant has larger effects on gender-related cases as opposed to non-
gender-related cases by estimating the following differences-in-differences specification:
Conservative Votejcit =αGender Related Casei + piGender Related Casei ∗ Gender Slantj
+ Gender Related Casei ∗ X′jγ+ δct + δj + ε jcit
where Gender Related Casei is an indicator variable equal to one if the case is on a gender-related
issue and zero otherwise, and all other variables are defined as before.
Appendix Table 9: Differential Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions by Whether a Case is Gender-
Related, Differences-in-Differences Specification
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
(1)
Gender Slant * Gender-Related Case 0.027**
(0.013)
Democrat * Gender-Related Case -0.0832***
(0.029)
Female * Gender-Related Case 0.028
(0.039)
Observations 8565
Clusters 113
Outcome Mean 0.582
Circuit-Year FE X
Judge FE X
Additional Demographic Controls X
Notes: The table tests whether slanted senior judges are more likely to vote conservatively in gender-related rather than in non-gender-
related cases. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conservatively in a gender-related case on the gender slant
of the judge interacted with an indicator variable for the case being gender-related, demographic controls interacted with an indicator
variable for the case being gender-related, judge fixed effects, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party
of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience
prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 10: Effect of Gender Slant on Decisions in All Cases, U.S. Courts of Appeals Data
Dependent Variable Conservative Vote
Dataset Songer 5% Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant 0.003 0.003 0.007 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Democrat -0.027** -0.028** -0.010 -0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Female 0.025 0.014 0.003 0.023
(0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 13420 13420 13420 13420
Clusters 136 136 136 136
Outcome Mean 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Career FE X
Slant Excluding Gender-Related Cases X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on decisions. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if a judge voted conserva-
tively on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party
of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience
prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (2) additonally controls for two-way interactions of gender, party and race.
Column (3) controls instead for "career fixed effects", which are indicator variables equal to 1 if the judge sat on at least one panel in
a given circuit over a given 25-year period. Column (4) calculates gender slant using embeddings trained excluding gender-related
cases. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. The sample is restricted to cases where votes could be coded to be liberal or
conservative. Data on votes are from the U.S. Court of Appeal Dataset (Songer, 2008; Kuersten and Haire, 2011). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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A.9 Additional Results on Opinion Assignment
Appendix Table 11: Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Whether the Opinion has Specific
Author, or the Opinion is Per Curiam
Dependent Variable Has Author Per Curiam Decided
Unanimously
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender Slant 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Democrat 0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.003 -0.017 -0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Female -0.001 0.013 0.005 -0.004 0.020* 0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 171441 43601 171441 43601 171441 43601
Clusters 139 125 139 125 139 125
Outcome Mean 0.803 0.847 0.092 0.045 0.887 0.874
Circuit-Year FE X X X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X X X
One Female Judge on Panel X X X
Notes: The table shows the effect of the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, who assigns opinion authorship, on
whether the opinion has a specific author, on whether the opinion is per curiam, and on whether the decision was unanimous. We
regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the opinion has a specific author (columns (1) and (2)), if the opinion is per curiam (columns
(3) and (4)), or if the panel decided unanimously (columns (5) and (6)) on the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel,
demographic controls for the most senior judge, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing
President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being
appointed to an Appellate Court. Standard errors are clustered at the senior judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.10 Do Higher Slant Senior Judges Assign Different Cases to Female Judges?
It is possible that more slanted senior judges not only assign fewer opinions to female judges, but
also assign them opinions for cases that are different in topic or expected relevance, as proxied by
predicted forward citations. We estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:
Case Characteristicict =piFemale Authorc ∗ Gender SlantSENIORj
+ Female Authorc ∗ XSENIOR′j γ+ δct + δj + ε jictk
(6)
where Case Characteristicict is a characteristic of case i in circuit c in year t with senior judge j,
Female Authork is a dummy equal to 1 if the district judge is female, Gender Slantj is the gender
slant (standardized cosine similarity between the gender and career-family dimensions) of the
most senior judge on the panel j, XSENIORj are demographic controls for the senior judge,δct are
circuit-year fixed effects, and δj are senior judge fixed effects. The dataset is at the case level.
Standard errors are clustered at the senior judge level.
First, we examine whether slanted senior judges systematically assign cases on different top-
ics to female judges. Cases are classified as belonging to one of seven broad topics: economic
activity, First Amendment, due process, labor law, civil rights, privacy, and criminal appeals.
Appendix Figure 14 shows that overall, slanted senior judges do not appear to assign cases on
different topics to female judges, although they might be less likely to assign cases related to reg-
ulations of economic activity and First Amendment rights to female judges. Second, we study
whether slanted senior judges assign cases with systematically different expected relevance to fe-
male judges. Given that citations might be endogeneous to the gender of the judge, we proxy
for relevance using forward citations predicted based on circuit-year of the case, topic, and party
names. Again, as shown in Appendix Table 13, we find little evidence that slanted senior judges
are assigning different cases to female judges.
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Appendix Figure 14: Differential Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Topic of Cases As-
signed to by Author’s Gender
Economic Activity
First Amendment
Labor
Due Process
Civil Rights
Privacy
Criminal
-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
Coefficients and 95% CI
Notes: The graph explores whether slanted senior judges assign different types of cases to female judges. We regress a dummy for the
case being on a given topic on an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, the gender slant of the most
senior judge on the panel interacted with an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, demographic
controls for the most senior judge interacted with an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, senior
judge fixed, and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of
birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court.
The sample is restricted to cases with a specific author, with at least one female judge on the panel, and that are decided unanimously.
Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
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Appendix Table 13: Differential Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Predicted Case Impor-
tance by Author’s Gender
Dependent Variable Predicted
Forward
Citations
(1)
Gender Slant * Female Author 0.001
(0.002)
Democrat * Female Author 0.005
(0.009)
Female * Female Author -0.010
(0.009)
Observations 31616
Clusters 123
Outcome Mean 1.726
Circuit-Year FE X
Judge FE X
Additional Demographic Controls X
Notes: The table tests whether slanted senior judges assign different types of cases to female judges. We regress predicted forward
citations on an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, the gender slant of the most senior judge on
the panel interacted with an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, demographic controls for the
most senior judge interacted with an indicator variable for whether the opinion is assigned to a female judge, senior judge fixed, and
circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion,
law school attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is
restricted to cases with a specific author, with at least one female judge on the panel, and that are decided unanimously. Standard
errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.11 Additional Results for Reversals
Appendix Figure 15: Reversals and Promotions from District to Circuit Courts
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Share of Decisions Reversed
Notes: The graph shows the relationship between the probability of being elevated from a District to a Circuit Court and the share
of decisions that were reversed on appeal, conditional on demographic controls and circuit fixed effects. Demographic controls are
gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, and law school attended. The sample is restricted to
district judges for which we observe at least 50 cases (this requires that the case was appealed, and that we were able to match the
circuit court case to the respective district judge).
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Appendix Table 15: Reversals and Promotion from District to Circuit Courts
Dependent Variable Promoted to
Circuit Court
(1) (2)
Share of Decisions Reversed on Appeal -0.345**
(0.136)
Share of Votes to Reverse on Appeal -0.367***
(0.116)
Female 0.030 0.031
(0.028) (0.028)
Democrat -0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.018)
Observations 862 862
Outcome Mean 0.058 0.058
Circuit FE X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X
Notes: The table shows the relationship between reversals and promotion of judges from District to Circuit Courts. We regress an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge was elevated to a Circuit Court on the share of decisions that were reversed on Appeal
(column (1)) or the share of circuit judges that voted to reverse the decision (column (2)), demographic controls and circuit fixed
effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, and law school
attended. The sample is restricted to district judges for which we observe at least 50 cases (this requires that the case was appealed,
and that we were able to match the circuit court case to the respective district judge). Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.12 Additional Results for Citations
Appendix Table 16: Effect of Gender Slant on Probability of Citing a Female Judge, Additional
Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable Cites at Least One Female Judge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender Slant -0.006 -0.009* -0.009 -0.010 -0.009*
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Democrat -0.038** -0.011 -0.020 -0.013 -0.027***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Female 0.157*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.128*** -0.084**
(0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Share Female Clerks -0.018
(0.042)
Association Between Gender and -0.008
Positive/Negative Attributes (0.005)
Conservative Score (Epstein et al. 2013) -0.039
(0.035)
Observations 54301 107923 86910 83680 107923
Clusters 73 139 112 125 139
Outcome Mean 0.536 0.383 0.452 0.487 0.383
Circuit-Year FE X X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X X
Interacted Demographic Controls X
Excludes Self-Citations X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on the probability of citing at least one female judge. We regress a dummy equal to 1
if the majority opinion cites at least one case authored by a woman on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls and circuit-
year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. Column (1) additionally
controls for the share of clerks that are female. Column (2) additionally controls for the standardized cosine similarity between the
gender and career-family dimensions. The conservative score in column (3) is defined as the average share of conservative votes of
the judge in non gender-related cases from the Epstein et al. (2013) data. Column (4) additionally restricts the sample to cases decided
after 1980. Column (5) defines the outcome excluding self-citations. The sample is restricted to cases in which the opinion is authored
by a specific judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
71
A.13 Effect of Gender Slant on Other Judge Characteristics
Appendix Table 17: Effect of Assigning-Judge Gender Slant on Author’s Characteristics other than
Gender
Dependent Variable Author is Author is Author
Democrat Minority Age
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Slant -0.007 0.005 0.041
(0.006) (0.008) (0.175)
Democrat 0.224*** -0.002 0.081
(0.011) (0.013) (0.382)
Female 0.030 0.027* 0.056
(0.019) (0.016) (0.563)
Observations 92816 23436 120365
Clusters 139 126 139
Outcome Mean 0.616 0.340 63.030
Circuit-Year FE X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X
Panel Includes Democrat Judge X
Panel Includes Minority Judge X
Notes: The table shows the effect of the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, who is in charge of assigning opinion
authorship, on the characteristics of the authoring judge. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the authoring judge was
appointed by a Democratic President (column (1)), if the authoring judge is minority (column (2)) and age of the authoring judge
(column (3)) on the gender slant of the most senior judge on the panel, demographic controls for the most senior judge, and circuit-
year fixed effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school
attended, and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to
cases with a specific author that are decide unanimously. Column (1) additionally restricts the sample to cases with one democratic
judge on the panel and column (2) to cases with one minority judge on the panel. Standard errors are clustered at the senior judge
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 18: Differential Effect of Gender Slant on Reversals of District Court Cases by
District Judge Characteristics other than Gender
Dependent Variable Votes to Reverse
District Decision
(1) (2)
Gender Slant * Democrat District Judge 0.005
(0.004)
Democrat * Democrat District Judge -0.006
(0.007)
Female * Democrat District Judge -0.003
(0.010)
Gender Slant * Minority District Judge 0.0112**
(0.005)
Democrat * Minority District Judge 0.002
(0.007)
Female * Minority District Judge 0.016
(0.011)
Observations 145862 145862
Clusters 133 133
Outcome Mean 0.177 0.177
Circuit-Year FE X X
Judge FE X X
District Judge FE X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on probability of reversal of district court decisions. We regress an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the judge votes to reverse the district decision on the gender slant of the judge interacted with an indicator variable
for whether the district judge was appointed by a Democratic President (column (1)) or is a minority (column (2)), demographic
controls interacted with an indicator variable for whether the district judge was appointed by a Democratic President (column (1))
or is a minority (column (2)), judge fixed effects, district judge fixed effects and circuit-year fixed effects. Demographic controls are
gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended, and whether the judge had federal
experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases for which we were able to determine the
identity of the district judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table 19: Effect of Gender Slant on Probability of Citing a Judge with Characteristics
other than Gender
Dependent Variable Cites Cites Average Average
Democrat Minority Age Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Slant -0.008** -0.006 -0.072 0.113***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.082) (0.012)
Democrat 0.008 -0.021* -0.071 0.013
(0.007) (0.011) (0.105) (0.018)
Female 0.023** 0.058*** 0.026 -0.032
(0.009) (0.011) (0.173) (0.022)
Observations 107923 107923 107923 98435
Clusters 139 139 139 139
Outcome Mean 0.875 0.336 61.407 0.052
Circuit-Year FE X X X X
Additional Demographic Controls X X X X
Notes: The table shows the effect of gender slant on the probability of citing judges with different characteristics. We regress a dummy
equal to 1 if the majority opinion cites at least one case authored by a judge nominated by a Democratic President (column (1)), at least
one case authored by a minority judge (column (2)), the average age of the authors of cited opinions (column (3)), and the average
slant of the authors of the cited opinions (column (4)) on the gender slant of the judge, demographic controls and circuit-year fixed
effects. Demographic controls are gender, party of appointing President, region of birth, cohort of birth, religion, law school attended,
and whether the judge had federal experience prior to being appointed to an Appellate Court. The sample is restricted to cases in
which the opinion is authored by a specific judge. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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